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BOARD OF REVIEW SMiyil/ERT/cd 
The Industrial Camiission of Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
GAYIE M. FUI1ERT0N 
S.S.A. No. 528-11-6899 : 
: Case No. 92-A-3239 
: DECISION 
: Case No. 92-BR-241 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY : 
The enplqyer, Albertsons, Inc., appeals the decision of the 
Administrative law Judge in the above-entitled matter which held that the 
claimant, Gayle M. Fullerton, had been discharged frxxn his employment with 
the enplqyer for reasons that are not disqualifying under Section 
35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act. The AU's decision, 
therefore, allowed payment of unemployment benefits to the claimant effective 
April 5, 1992, and oDntinuing, provided he is otherwise eligible. The ALJ's 
decision also held the employer liable for benefit charges pursuant to 
Section 35-4-7 (c) of the Act. 
After careful consideration of the record in this matter, the 
Board of Review finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge to be a 
correct application of the provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act, 
supported by corpetent evidence and, therefore, affirms the decision. In so 
holding, the Board of Review adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
The employer argues on appeal that the ALJ erred in finding the 
claimant slipped and broke the battery plate accidentally. The enplqyer 
further argues that a thorough review of the record reveals that the 
employer's witness, Mr. Ellis, was more credible than the claimant. 
In affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, the 
Board of Review notes that the enplqyer is correct in its argument that this 
case hinges on balancing the respective credibility of Mr. Ellis and the 
claimant. The ALJ, who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of both 
witnesses, made a specific finding that the claimant "seems more credible to 
the Administrative Law Judge." The Board of Review only reviews written 
transcripts and documents associated with the Administrative Law Judge 
hearing and does not have the opportunity to observe witnesses. The Board 
must, therefore, rely on the impressions of the ALJ on matters of credibility 
derived from deserving the demeanor of the witnesses. Since the 
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Administrative Law Judge found the claiitant to be more believable than the 
enployer witness and since the AU's finding of fact that the claiitant 
accidentally slipped and inadvertently broke the battery plate is supported 
by substantial cotpetent evidence in the record, the Board affirms that 
finding and affirms the Administrative Law Judge's decision that the enployer 
did not have just cause within the meaning of the Utah Btplqyment Security 
Act for discharging the claimant. 
This decision becanes final on the date it is mailed, and any 
further appeal must be made within 30 days fron the date of mailing. Your 
appeal mast be submitted in writing to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtcwn 
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. To file an 
appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must suixnit to the Clerk of the Court a 
Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to 
Section 63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and Rule 14 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and 
a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
/s/ Stephen M. Hadley 
/s/ Thatas L. Lewis 
Although the Administrative Law Judge made a specific finding 
regarding the respective credibility of the claimant and Mr. Ellis, my 
reading of the record persuades me that Mr. Ellis' version of the incident 
leading to the claimants discharge is more trustworthy than the claimant's 
and I would overrule the AU's finding that the claimant was more 
credible than Mr. Ellis. 
Mr. Ellis had no apparent advantage to be gained by saying the 
claiitant repeatedly and willfully beat on the battery plate. The claimant in 
fact testified that he and Mr. Ellis got along well and no motive is 
suggested in the record why Mr. Ellis would lie. When asked if he could 
have been mistaken about what he saw, Mr. Ellis was steadfast in repeating 
that the claimant was beating on the plate in frustration, not just trying to 
regain his balance after a fall. The claiitant on the other hand, when 
accused of beating on the employer's property, had everything to gain by 
claiming he slipped and accidentally damaged the battery plate. The 
claimant's account is further thrcwi into question because of his claim two 
years earlier that he accidentally slipped and broke a door jam when he was 
kicking at a door while horsing around. I find the claimant's repeated 
excuse of "slipping" when others reported more willful behavior to be 
suspicious. 
GAYIE M. KJLLERTCN - 3 - Case No, 92-A-3239 
S.S.A. No, 528-11-6899 Case No. 92-ER-241 
Mr. Ellis' version of the event leading to the claimant's 
discharge has not varied from the time he first reported it. He has asserted 
from the beginning that he saw the claimant beat numerous tines in 
frustration on the battery plate. The ALJ minimized Mr. Ellis' observation 
by making a finding that Mr. Ellis was unable to see the claimant's feet and 
so could not see if the claimant was falling. Mr. Ellis' testimony, 
however, was that though he iromentarily could not see the claimant's feet, 
the claimant was not falling, but was clearly beating on the battery plate 
in anger evidenced by the fact that the claimant struck the battery plate 
again and threatened Mr. Ellis after he told him to stop. 
The claimant admitted he hit the battery plate at least twice. 
This version seems inherently inconsistent to me as to hit the plate twice 
would have meant he slipped and fell twice upon the battery plate. This is 
not the claimant's testimony. He testified rather that he slipped once, then 
stood up, and hit the plate with his hand. This story does not ring true to 
me ard is not at all consistent with the observations of Mr. Ellis. For 
these reasons, I would overrule the Administrative Law Judge's finding of 
fact that the employer's property was damaged accidentally by the claimant. 
Furthermore, I disagree with the Administrative law Judge's 
conclusions about the inappropriateness of the employer referencing past 
infractions of the claimant in arriving at its conclusion to discharge the 
claimant. The union contract provided that employee warning notices will not 
remain in effect for more than one year. The infraction for which the 
claimant was discharged, willful destruction of ccnpany property, was grounds 
for immediate dismissal under the employer's rules. There was no need on the 
part of the employer to go through any step-by-step disciplinary procedure in 
the face of the claimant's actions and they did not do so. Referencing his 
past behavior of Jacking in a door was not necessary to sustain a discharge 
but only adds strength to the enployer's argument that this was an employee 
who exercised marginal control over his temper and who the employer might 
reasonably expect to see repeat destructive behavior. By referencing the 
claimant's past behavior the employer established both the elements of 
knowledge and harm as required to make a finding of just cause under the Utah 
Employment Security Act. For these reasons, I dissent fron the majority 
opinion and would reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge that 
the claimant was not discharged for just cause and that the employer is 
chargeable for benefits paid in connection with this claim. 
/s/ Lawrence Disera 
Dated this 27th day of July, 1992. 
Date Mailed: July 30, 1992. 
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DATE OF DECISION: April 29, 1992 DATE OF HEARING: June 1, 1992 
APPEAL FILED: May 4, 1992 PIACE OF HEARING: Salt Lake City, Utah 
ISSUES: 35-4-5(b)(l), 35-4-7 (c) APPEARANCES: Claimant/Brployer 
EFFECTIVE EftTE OF DENIAL: april 5, 1992 
Unenplqyment insurance benefits were denied on the grounds the claimant was 
dismissed for reasons which were disqualifying. This decision relieved the 
employer's benefit ratio account for benefits paid to the claimant. 
Jurisdiction for this review is established in accordance with Section 35-4-
6(c) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Rules pertaining thereto. 
Decision dated and mailed: June 3f 1992 
The following decision will becxxne firal unless, within 30 days from the date of 
this decision, further written appeal is made to the Board of Review (PO Box 
11600, Salt Lake City, UT 84147) setting forth the grounds upon which the appeal 
is made. 
LLS/lg 
cc: Albertsons, Inc. 
c/o Gibbens Company 
Attn: Robert Watson 
P.O. Box 7832 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
(Applicable Sections of the Utah Brnployment Security Act and Rules and 
Regulations are quoted on the following pages. 
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FINDINGS OF EftCT: 
Prior to filing for unenployment benefits effective April 5, 1992, the claimant 
earned $11.10 per hour working full-time as a forklift operator for Albertsons 
where he was enployed fron April 5, 1981 to April 3, 1992. The claimant was 
discharged fron this enployer for the reasons set forth as follows. 
The cxmpany policy allows for the immediate dismissal of an employee who 
willfully damages company property. The claimant was aware of the policy. 
The union contract Albertsons has with Teamsters Local #222 provides that warning 
notices an employee may receive will not remain in effect for more than one year. 
The claimant received two warning notices. One was in April 1989 for operating 
equipment in an unsafe manner. The second was in January 1990 for willful 
destruction of company property. Prior to April 1989, the claimant had received 
no prior reprimands. On approximately April 19, 1989, the claimant had just 
finished putting a pallet on a crcwn when another driver drove up beside him and 
put a pallet beside his. This driver asked the claimant about a business matter. 
In the course of the conversation, the claimant forgot he had not lowered the 
forks. When he drove away and turned the corner, the forks caught on an object 
which resulted in the forklift tipping over. The claimant was placed on 
suspension without pay frora April 20, 1989 to April 25, 1989. On January 31, 
1990, the crew was leaving early. It was Superbcwl Sunday. The door to the time 
clock was locked. The claimant and two others began "goofing around" by banging 
on the door. The claimant kicked the door. He hit it harder than he expected. 
A board by the doorknob cracked. The claimant estimated the cost of repair to be 
$5.00. The door did not open. The claimant received two weeks suspension 
without pay for the infraction. 
On April 2, 1992, the claimant needed to change his lift trucks battery. The 
claimant was a long term employee and had experience performing this task. The 
batteries weighed fifteen hundred to eighteen hundred pounds. The batteries are 
on rollers so they can be pushed out of the truck onto a truck like rack system 
with rollers. In turn, the new battery moves off onto the truck cm rollers. A 
heavy metal plate holds the battery in place. The process takes two people. 
The claimant drove his reach truck along side of the battery rack. He asked the 
maintenance person for a battery change. While he was waiting for the 
maintenance man, he removed the old battery. He had pushed the new battery into 
the truck but was having difficulty securing it with the metal plate. The 
maintenance man was on the opposite side of the truck. In this position, the 
maintenance man could not see the claimant's feet. The claimant slipped. When 
he tried to regain his balance, the metal plate he had in his hand hit the lift 
and chipped it. The maintenance man believed the claimant purposefully broke the 
battery cover. The maintenance man told the claimant if he did that again he 
would turn him in. The claimant responded to go ahead and turn him in and that 
it would be the last thing he did. The claimant thought the maintenance man was 
joking. Both perceived the other to be in a bad mood that day. 
The maintenance man did report the claimant to his supervisor. In addition, he 
wrote: 
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On april 2, 1992 at the approximate time of 5:30 a.m. Gail 
(sic) Fullerton asked for a battery. When I got out there he 
had pushed his old battery out and his new one in and had 
difficulty putting in the retaining plate for the battery and 
started hitting the top plastic cover repeatedly, when I told 
him to stop or I would turn him in he hit it one more time 
and told me to go ahead he didnft give a shit. Then he told 
me if I did I'd regret it. 
Earl L. Ellis 
4-2-92 
Based on the maintenance persons account of what occurred, coupled with the past 
reprimands, the company decided the claimant willfully broke the plastic battery 
cover and discharged him. The claimant did tell the company the damage was not 
intentionally. 
REASONING AND OCNOUSION OF IAW: 
The company did consider the past reprimands when deciding to discharge the 
claimant. The 1989 and 1990 incidents were given no weight with respect to this 
decision. The company violated its union agreement by adding these reprimands to 
their decision to dismiss the claimant. Both incidents occunred over two years 
ago, well outside the time limitation as per the union contract, for 
consideration. Moreover, the 1989 occurrence was a one time isolated instance 
due to inadvertence when the claimant became distracted. The 1990 mishap was the 
result of horseplay. While the kicking of the door is not condoned, it was not 
meant to be destructive. 
The claimant and the maintenance man have scxne crucial differences in their 
testimony with respect to the April 2, 1992 battery change. The maintenance man 
testified the claimant beat the plastic battery cover repeatedly. He did not say 
the claimant broke it, however. The claimant stated he did not break this cover 
nor did he hit it. He contends it was broken before he went to the battery area. 
The claimant asserts he lost his balance while changing the battery and, in this 
process, the metal plate he was holding in his hand inadvertently hit the fork 
lift. Inportantly, the maintenance man could not view the claimant's feet during 
the entire process. While their testimony is different, the claimant seems more 
credible to the Administrative Law Judge. Even if the credibility issue is not 
considered, the weight of the evidence in a discharge case rests with the 
employer. If the weight is equal, the scales tip to the claimant in a discharge 
case. 
Section 35-4-5 (b) (1) of the Utah Employment Security Act provides that a 
claimant for unemployment insurance benefits is not eligible if he or she was 
discharged from employment for just cause or an act or omission in connection 
with the employment which was deliberate, willful or wanton and adverse to the 
employer's rightful interests. In order to support a denial of unemployment 
insurance benefits, an enployer must establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence the claimant was at fault in causing his or her own unemployment. That 
is, the claimant mast be shewn to have had a substantial degree of control, 
knowledge and culpability in the conduct resulting in discharge. Thus, a 
claimant will not generally be denied unemployment benefits where discharged for 
mere inability, inefficiency, inadvertence or isolated incidents of good faith 
error in iudament or ardinarv necfHcr^ nnp-
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The enployer did not establish by the preponderance of the evidence that the 
claimants actions rose to the level of culpability, knowledge and ccxitrol to 
impose a disqualification. The claimant's testimony is accepted that the damage 
done on April 2, 1992 was accidental. It is held he was discharged at the 
convenience of the enployer but not for disqualifying just cause. Benefits are 
awarded. 
A ocMitributing enployer may be relieved of charges if an individual is separate 
for reasons which are disqualifying. Since the claimant was separated for 
reasons which are not disqualifying, the enployer is not relieved of charges, for 
the claim. 
DECISION: 
The decision of the adjudicator denying benefits pursuant to Section 35-4-5 (b) (1) 
of the Utah Employment Security Act is reversed. Benefits are allowed effective 
April 5, 1992 and continuing provided the claimant is otherwise eligible. 
Albertsons is not relieved of charges for Gayle M. Fullerton pursuant to Section 
35-4-7 (c) 3(C) of the Act. 
La Vone Liddle^monal ^J^** 
Administrative Law Judge 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
R475-5a-8 INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 20 
a A claimant may have good cause for leaving if 
the quit was due to discriminatory and unlawful sex-
ual harassment, provided the emplover was given a 
chance to take necessary action to alleviate the objec-
tionable conduct Sexual harassment is a form of sex 
discrimination which is prohibited by Title VII of the 
U S Civil Rights Act Sexual harassment is intimi-
dation by a person of either sex against a person of 
the opposite or same sex. For sexual harassment to be 
discrimination, the following three elements must be 
shown to exist 
(1) Unwanted conduct or communication of a sex-
ual nature which aoverselv affects a person's employ-
ment relationship or working environment, if 
(a) submission to the conduct is either an explicit 
or implicit term or condition of employment, or 
(b) submission to or rejection of the conduct is used 
as a basis for an emplovment decision affecting the 
person, or 
ic) the conduct has a purpose or effect of substan-
tially interfering with a person s work performance or 
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work 
environment, 
(2) Unsolicited, deliberated sexual statements, 
gestures or physical contacts which are objectionable 
to the recipient, 
(3) Undermines the integrity of the workplace, de-
strovs morale and offends legal and social standards 
of acceptable behavior 
b Inappropriate behavior which has sexual conno-
tation but does not meet the test of sexual discrimina-
tion is insufficient to establish good cause for leaving 
work 
11 Discrimination 
It is also a violation of Federal law to discriminate 
against am individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of the individual s race, color, religion sex, or 
national origin, or to limit, segregate, or classify em-
ployees in an> wa\ which would deprive or tend to 
deprive an individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adverseh affect his status as an employee 
because of the individual s race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin 
R475-5a-8. Effective Date of Disqualification. 
1 The disqualification under this section techni-
cally begins with the week the claimant voluntarily 
aui: the job However, to avoid the confusion which 
arises when a disqualification is made for a period of 
time prior to the filing of a claim, the claimant will be 
notified that benefits are denied beginning with the 
effective date of a new or reopened claim The dis-
qualification continues until the claimant returns to 
work in a bona fiae covered employment and earns 
six times his weekly benefit amount after the week in 
which the claimant left work A disqualification 
which begins in one benefit year will continue into a 
new benefit year unless purged by subsequent earn-
ings 
2 If an individual is receiving remuneration which 
is attributed to a period of time following the last dav 
of work, such as severance or vacation pay, the "week 
in which the claimant left work" is considered to be 
the last week for which such remuneration was at-
tributable as an individual is not "unemployed" while 
receiving remuneration from an employer, and such 
severance or vacation pay cannot be used to purge a 
disqualification 
R475-5b. Discharge and Discharge for 
Crime. 
R475-5b-101 Discharge General Definition 
R475-5b-102 Just Cause 
R475-5b-103 Burden of Proof 
R475-5b-104 Quit or Discharge 
R475-5b-105 Disciplinary Suspension or Involun-
tary Furlough 
R475-5b-106 Proximal Cause — Relation of Offenses 
to Discharge 
R475-5b-107 In Connection wTith Employment 
R475-5b-108 Examples of Reasons for Discharge 
R475-5b-109 Effective Date of Disqualification 
R475-5b-201 Discharge for Crime — General Defini-
tion 
R475-5b-202 In Connection with Work 
R475-5b-203 Dishonest) or Other Disqualifying 
Crimes 
R475-5b-204 Admission or Conviction in a Court 
R475-5b-205 Benefits Held in Abeyance 
R475-5b-206 Disqualification Period 
R475-5b-101. Discharge General Definition. 
Ordinarily accepted concepts of justice are used in 
determining if a discharge is disqualifying under the 
"lust cause" provisions of the Act Just cause is de-
fined as a iob separation that is necessarv due to the 
seriousness of actual or potential harm to the em-
plover provided the claimant had knowledge of the 
employer s expectations and had control over the cir-
cumstances which led to the discharge Just cause is 
not established if the reason for the discharge is base-
less arbitral-} or capricious or the emplover has 
failed to uniformh appl> reasonable standards to all 
emplovees when instituting disciphnarv action The 
purpose of this section is to deny benefits to individ-
uals who bring about their own unemployment bv 
conducting themselves, with respect to their employ-
ment with callousness, misbehavior, or lack of consid-
eration to such a degree that the emplover was justi-
fied m discharging the emplovee However, when an 
emplovee is discharged b\ his emplover, such dis-
charge may have been the result of incompetence, 
lack of skill or other reasons which are bevond the 
claimant's control The question which must be estab-
lished bv the evidence i^  whether the claimant is at 
fault in his resulting unemployment Unemployment 
insurance benefits will be denied if the emplover had 
lust cause for discharging the employee However, not 
even cause for discharge proviaes a basis to deny 
benefits In order to have just cause for discharge pur-
suant to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) there must be some fault 
on the part of the employee involved 
R475-5b-102. Just Cause. 
1 The basic factors which establish just cause, and 
are essential for a determination of ineligibility are 
a Culpability 
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the sever-
ity of the offense as it affects continuance of the em-
ployment relationship The discharge must have been 
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to the 
employer's rightful interests A discharge would not 
be considered ' necessary" if it is not consistent with 
reasonable employment practices The wTongness of 
the conduct must he considered in the context of the 
particular employment and how it affects the em-
ployer s rights If the conduct was an isolated incident 
of poor judgment and there is no exnectatinn thnt tKp 
21 EMPLOYMENT SECURITY/JOB SERVICE R475-5b-104 
may not be shown and therefore it is not necessary to 
discharge the employee. 
(1) Longevity and pnor work record are important 
in determining if the act or omission is an isolated 
incident or a good faith error in judgment. An em-
ployee who has historically complied with work rules 
does not demonstrate by a single violation, even 
though harmful, that such violations will be repeated 
and therefore require discharge to avoid future harm 
to the employer. For example: A long term employee 
who does not have a history of tardiness or absentee-
ism is absent without leave for a number of days due 
to a death in his immediate family. Although this is a 
violation of the employer's rules and may establish 
just cause for discharging a new employee, the fact 
that the employee has established over a long period 
of time that he complies with attendance rules shows 
that the circumstance is more of an isolated incident 
rather than a violation of the rules that is or could be 
expected to be habitual In this case because the po-
tential for harm to the employer is not shown, it is 
not necessary for the employer to discharge the em-
ployee, and therefore just cause is not established 
b Knowledge 
The employee must have had a knowledge of the 
conduct which the employer expected It is not neces-
sary that the claimant intended to cause harm to the 
employer, but he should reasonably have been able to 
anticipate the effect his conduct would have Knowl-
edge may not be established unless the employer 
gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or 
had a pertinent written Dohcy, except in the case of a 
flagrant violation of a universal standard of behavior. 
If the employer's expectations are unclear, ambig-
uous or inconsistent, the existence of knowledge is 
not shown. A specific warning is one way of showing 
that the employee had knowledge of the expected con-
duct After the employee is given a warning he should 
be given an opportunity to correct objectionable con-
duct. Additional violations occurring after the warn-
ing would be necessary to establish just cause for a 
discharge 
(1) For Example When the employer has an estab-
lished procedure of progressive discipline, such proce-
dures generally must have been followed in order to 
establish that the employee had knowledge of the ex-
pected behavior or the seriousness of the act. The ex-
ception is that very severe conduct, such as criminal 
actions, may justify immediate discharge without fol-
lowing a progressive disciplinary program 
c Control 
fhe conduct must have been within the power and 
capacity of the claimant to control or prevent 
2
- Just cause may not be established when the rea-
son for discharge is based on such things as mere 
*ni8takes, inefficiency, failure of performance as the 
result of inability or incapacity, inadvertence in ISO-
ated instances, good faith errors in judgment or in 
£*e exercise of discretion, minor but casual or unin-
tentional carelessness or negligence, etc These exam-
ples of conduct are not disqualifying because of the 
ck of knowledge or control However, continued m-
^ c i e n c y , repeated carelessness, or lack of care exer-
~**d by ordinary, reasonable workers in similar cir-
^astances , may be disqualifying depending on the 
*~f°n and degree of the carelessness, the knowledge 
- ? ^ t r o 1 °f t h e emPloy*e. 
T*» The term "just cause" as used in Section 5(b)(1) 
f-^ not lessen the requirement that there be some 
the lQM**16 p a r t o f tJae emplovee involved. Prior to 
«1983 addition of the term ^ust cause" the Com-
J U
» u m interpreted Section 5(b)(1) to require an in-
tentional infliction of harm or intentional disregard 
of the employer's interests. The intent of the Legisla-
ture m adding the words "just cause" to Section 
5(b)(1) was apparently to correct this restrictive in-
terpretation While some fault must be present, it is 
sufficient that the acts were intended, the conse-
quences were reasonably foreseeable, and that such 
acts have serious effect on the employee's job or the 
employer's interests. 
R475-5b-103. Burden of Proof. 
1. In a discharge, the employer initiates the sepa-
ration and, as such, is the primary source of informa-
tion with regard to the reasons for the dismissal. The 
employer has the burden of proof which is the respon-
sibility to establish the facts resulting in the dis-
charge The employer is required by the Statute m 
Section 35-4-11(g) to keep accurate records and to 
provide correct information to the Department for 
proper administration of the Act Although the em-
ployer has the burden to establish just cause for the 
discharge, if sufficient facts are obtained from the 
claimant, a decision will be made based on the infor-
mation available The failure of one party to provide 
information does not necessarily result in a ruling 
favorable to the other party 
2. All interested parties have the right to give re-
buttal to information contrary to the interests of that 
party. 
R475-5b-I04. Quit or Discharge. 
The determination of whether a separation is a quit 
or a discharge is made by the Department based on 
the circumstances which resulted in the separation. 
The conclusions on the employer's records, the sepa-
ration notice or the claimant's report are not control-
ling on the Department 
1 Discharge Before Effective Date of Resignation 
a Discharge 
When an individual notifies an employer that he 
intends to leave as of a definite date in the future and 
is discharged prior to that date, the cause for the sep-
aration on the day the separation takes place is the 
controlling factor in determining whether it was a 
quit or discharge Although the separation might 
have been motivated by the claimants announced 
resignation, the employer was the moving party in 
ending the employment prior to the resignation date 
Therefore, the immediate reason was more closely re-
lated to the emplover s action than to the claimant's 
announced intention to quit Unless disqualifying 
conduct is involved, the separation is considered to be 
for the convenience of the employer If the employer 
does not pay regular wages through the period of the 
notice but merely pays vacation pav which was not 
previously assigned to the period of the notice, the 
separation is still the result of a discharge which oc-
curs prior to the date the worker planned to quit The 
assignment of vacation pay to the period of time be-
tween the notice of intended resignation and the last 
date the employee planned work does not change the 
character of the separation. 
b Quit 
If an employee announces a future date of resigna-
tion and is relieved of work responsibilities but is 
paid regular wages through the date of his announced 
resignation, it is not a discharge, but a quit. 
2. Leaving in Anticipation of Discharge 
When an employee leaves work m anticipation of a 
possible discharge or layoff, and if the reason for the 
discharge would not be disqualifying, the separation 
is generally considered to be a voluntary quit. How-
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ever, an individual who leaves work to avoid virtu-
ally certain discharge for disqualifying conduct can-
not thereby avoid the disqualifying provisions of Sec-
tion 35-4-5(b), and the separation is considered a dis-
charge rather than voluntary leaving 
3 Employee Knows His Action will Result in Dis-
charge 
Absence taken without permission, or other actions 
contrary to specific reasonable instructions from tne 
employer, are generally considered a voluntary sepa-
ration rather than discharge if the worker was given 
a choice of complying or being separated 
R475-5b-105. Disciplinary Suspens ion or Invol-
u n t a r y Fu r lough . 
When an emplovee is put on a disciplinary suspen-
sion or involuntary furlough, he may meet the defini-
tion of' unemployed ' If the claimant files during the 
suspension or furlough, the reason for the suspension 
or furlough must be adjudicated as a discharge, even 
though the claimant is still attached to the employer 
and expects to return to work A suspension which 
was reasonable and necessan to prevent potential 
harm to the employer or to maintain necessars disci-
pline would generally result in a disqualification un-
der this section provided the elements of control and 
knowledge are present Failure to return to work at 
the end of the definite period of suspension or fur-
lough would be considered a voluntary quit and eligi-
bility would then be determined consistent with Sec-
tion 35-4-5la), if the claimant had not been previouslv 
denied 
R475-5b-106. P rox ima l Cause — Rela t ion of Of-
fenses to Discharge . 
1 Tne cause for discharge is that conduct which 
motivates the employer to make the decision to ter-
minate the employee's services If the decision has 
truly been made, it is generally demonstrated b\ wa\ 
of notice to the employee or the initiation of a person-
nel action Although the employer ma\ learn of other 
offenses following the making of the decision to ter-
minate, the reason for tne discharge is limited to that 
conduct of which the employer was aware prior to 
maKing the decision However if the employer dis-
cnarges a person because of some p r e h m m a n evi-
dence of certain conduct but does not obtain all of tne 
proof of the conduct until after the separation notice 
is given, it coula still be concluded that the discharge 
was caused b\ that conduct which the employer was 
investigating Eligibility for benefits will tnen be de-
termined b\ considering tne extent of culpabihts, 
knowledge and control 
2 When the discnarge does not occur immediateh 
after the employer becomes aware of an offense, a 
presumption arises that there were otner reasons for 
the discharge Tnis relationship between the offense 
and the discharge must be established both as to 
cause and time The presumption that the conduct 
was not the cause of the discharge ma\ be overcome 
by a showing that the delay was due to such things as 
investigation, arbitration, or hearings conducted witn 
regard to the employee's conduct W^en a grievance 
or arbitration is pending with respect to the dis-
charge, the Department's decision will be based on 
the information available to the Department The De-
partment's decision is not binding on the grievance 
resolution process or an arbitrator and the decision of 
e arbitrator is not binding on the Department 
When an employer is faced with the necessit> of a 
reduction in his workforce but uses an employee's 
pnor conduct as the c n t e n a for determining who will 
be laid off, the lack of work is the primary motivation 
or cause of the discharge, not the conduct. 
R475-5b-107. In Connect ion with Employment 
Disqualifying conduct is not limited to offenses 
which take place on the employer s premises or dur-
ing business hours It is onlv necessary that the con-
duct have such ' connection" to the employee's duties 
and to the employer s business that it is a subiect of 
legitimate and significant concern to the employer 
All employers, both public and private have the right 
to expect emplovees to refrain from acts wrhich are 
detrimental to the business or would bring dishonor 
on the business name or the institution Legitimate 
interests of employers include, but are not limited to 
goodwill of customers reputation of the business effi-
cienc>, business costs, morale of employees, disci-
pline, honest}, trust and loyalty 
R475-5b-108. Examples of Reasons for Dis-
cha rge . 
In all the following examples, the basic elements of 
lust cause must be considered in determining ehgibil-
\t\ for benefits Tne following examples do not in-
clude all reasons for discharge 
1 Violation of Compan> Rules 
If an emplovee violates reasonable rules of the em-
ployer and the three elements of culpability, knowl-
edge and control are established, benefits must be 
denied 
a The reasonableness of the employer's rules will 
depend on the necessit} for such a rule as it affects 
the employer s interests Rules which are contrary to 
general public pohc\ or which infringe upon the rec-
ognized rights and privileges of individuals may not 
be reasonable An employer must have broader pre-
rogatives in regulating conduct when emplovees are 
on the job than when they are not An employer must 
be able to make rules for emplovee on-the-job conduct 
tnat reasonably furtner the legitimate business inter-
ests of the employer An employer is not required to 
impose onh minimum standards but there may be 
some justifiable cause for violations of rules that are 
unreasonable or unduly harsh rigorous or exacting 
When rules are changed adequate notice and reason-
able opportunity to comply must be afforded If the 
emplovee believes a rule is unreasonable he has the 
responsibihu to discuss his concerns with the em-
plover and give the employer an opportunit\ to take 
corrective action 
b Discharges ma\ be regulated bv an employment 
contract or collective bargaining agreement Jus t 
cause for the discharge is not established if tne em-
plovee s conduct was consistent with his rights under 
such contract or tne discharge was contran to the 
provisions of such contract 
c Habitual offenses may not be disqualifying con-
duct if it is found that the act was condoned by the 
employer or was so prevalent as to be customary 
However, when the worker is given notice that the 
conduct will no longer be tolerated, further violations 
could result in a denial of benefits 
d Culpability may be established even if the result 
of the violation of the rule does not in and of itself 
cause harm to the employer, but the resultant lack of 
compliance with rules diminishes the employer's abil-
ity to have order and control Culpability is estab-
lished if termination of the emplovee was required to 
maintain necessar\ discipline in the company 
e Knowledge of the employer's standards of behav-
ior is usually provided in the form of verbal instruc-
tions, wnt ten rules and/or warnings However, the 
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warning is not always necessary for a disqualification 
to apply in cases of violations of a serious nature of 
universal standards of conduct of which the claimant 
ahould have been aware without being warned 
2 Attendance Violations 
a It is the duty ot the worker to be punctual and 
remain at work within the reasonable requirements 
of the employer Discharge for unjustified absence or 
tardiness is considered disqualifying if the worker 
knows that he is violating attendance rules Such vio-
lations are generally a serious matter of concern to 
emplovers as attendance standards are necessary to 
maintain order, control, and productivity Discharge 
for an attendance violation beyond the control of the 
worker is not disqualifying unless the worker reason-
ably could have given notice or obtained permission 
consistent with the employers rules 
b In cases of termination for violations of atten 
dance standards the emolovee s recent historv of at 
tendance shall be considered to determine if the vio 
lation is an isolated incident or demonstrates a pat-
tern of unjustified absences within the control of the 
emplovee Flagrant misuse of attendance privileges 
may result in a denial of benefits even if the last 
incident was beyond the emplovee s control 
3 Falsification of Work Record 
a The dutv of honestv is inherent in any em 
ployee employer relationship A statement made in 
an application for a job may be considered as con 
nected with the work even though it is made before 
the work begins An individual begins his obligations 
as an emplovee when he makes an application for 
work One of those obligations is to give the employer 
truthful answers to all material questions Any falsi 
ncation of information which may operate to expose 
the employer to possible loss litigation or damage 
would be considered material and therefore mav e$ 
tabhsh culpability If the claimant made a false state-
ment while applying for work in order to be hired 
benefits ma> be denied even if the claimant would 
have otherwise remained unemployed and eligible for 
the receipt of unemployment benefits depending upon 
the degree of knowledge culpability and control 
4 Insubordination 
Authority is required in the work place to maintain 
°raer and efficiency An employer has the right to 
expect that lines of authority will be maintained that 
reasonable orders given in a ci\il manner will be 
obeved that supervisors will be respected and that 
their authority will not be undermined In determin-
mg when insubordination (resistance to authority) 
becomes disqualifying conduct the fact that there 
was a disregard of the emplovers interests is the 
major importance Mere protests or dissatisfaction 
^thout an overt act is not in disregard of the em-
ployer s interests However provocative remarks to a 
8upenor or vulgar or profane language in response to 
a
 civil request may be insubordination if it is condu-
cive to disruption of routine negation of authority 
aad impairment of efficiencv Mere incompatibility or 
emphatic insistence or discussion by an employee 
who was acting m good faith is not disqualifying con-
duct 
5 Loss of License 
When an employee loses a license which he knows 
IB required for the performance of the job, and the 
individual had control over the circumstances which 
faulted m the loss of the license, such conduct is 
disqualifying For example, if the claimant worked as 
a driver, and lost his license because of a conviction 
lor driving under the influence iDUI), culpability is 
established if he fails to obtain a permit to drive at 
work or the conviction would expose the emplover to 
additional liabilities The emplover cannot authorize 
an emplovee to drive in violation of the law Also, 
additional insurance costs or other liabilities are a 
legitimate concern of the employer Knowledge is es-
tablished because it is a matter of common knowledge 
in the State of Utah that driving under the influence 
of alcohol is a violation of the law and is punishable 
by loss of the individual's driving privileges Jucucial 
notice can be taken of this fact because a question 
relative to this matter is on every drivers license 
test He had control in that he made a conscious deci-
sion to risk loss of the license when he failed to make 
arrangements for transportation pnor to becoming 
under the influence of intoxicants 
R475-5b-109. Effective Date of Disqualification. 
The Act provides that any disqualification under 
this section will include the week in which the 
claimant was discharged ' However to avoid con-
fusion the denial of benefits will begin with the Sun-
day of the week for which claimant has filed for bene-
fits 
R475-5b-201 Discharge for Crime — General 
Definition 
1 A crime is a punishable act in violation of law, 
an offense against the State or the United States 
Crime and Misdemeanor are synonymous terms 
though in common usage crime is used to denote of-
fenses of a more serious nature However for exam-
ple an insignificant although illegal act or the tak-
ing or destruction of something which is of little or no 
value or believed to have been abandoned mav not be 
sufficient to establish that a crime was committed as 
defined for the application of this section of the Act 
even if the claimant was found guilty of a violation of 
the law 
2 The duties of honestv and responsible behavior 
are implied in any employment relationship A 
worker is obligated to deal with his employer respon-
sibly in truthfulness and good faith The penalties 
imposed bv this Section (a 52 week disqualification 
and subsequent denial until six times the weekh 
benefit amount has been earned in bona fide covered 
employment) are mandatory and cannot be reduced 
3 The factors which are essential for a diuaualifi 
cation under this provision of the law are that the 
mdiNidual was discharged for a crime that was 
a In connection with work 
b Dishonest or a felony or class A misdemeanor 
and 
c Admitted or established by a conviction in a 
court of law 
4 All discharges which are not disqualifying un-
der Section 35-4 5(b)(2) must be adjudicated under 
Section 35-4-5(b)(l) 
R475-ob-202. In Connection with Work. 
The connection to the work is not limited to of-
fenses which take place on the emplover s premises or 
during business hours The employer does not have to 
be the victim of the crime but the crime must 
adversely affect the emplover s rightful interest It is 
necessary that the conduct have a "connection'* to the 
employee s duties and to the employer s business that 
it is a subject of legitimate and significant concern 
All employers, both public and private have the nght 
to expect emplovees to rerrain from acts which are 
detrimental to the business or would bring dishonor 
on the business name of the institution Legitimate 
interests of emplovers include, but are not limited to 
goodwill of customers, reputation of the business, effi-
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ciency, business costs, morale of employees, disci-
pline, honesty, trust and loyalty 
R475-5b-203. Dishonesty or Other Disqualifying 
Crimes. 
1 Dishonesty in this context generally means 
theft Theft is the taking of property without tne 
owner's consent Theft also includes swindling and 
embezzlement and obtaining possession of property 
by lawful means and thereafter appropriating it to 
the taker's own use Theft may be any of the follow-
ing acts done with intent to deprive the owner of his 
property (a) obtaining or exerting unauthorized con-
trol over property, (b) obtaining control over property 
by deception, (c) obtaining control by threat, (d> ob-
taining control knowing the property had been stolen, 
and, (e) obtaining services from another by deception, 
threat, coercion, stealth, mechanical tampering or by 
use of a false token or device 
2 Other disqualifying crimes are felonies and 
Class A misdemeanors which are related to emplo\ -
ment These may include, but are not limited to as-
sault, arson, or destruction of property For a crime 
not involving dishonesty, the claimant must be con-
victed of or admit to committing a felon> or a Class A 
misdemeanor Class A is the most serious class of 
misdemeanor Felonies are more serious than misde-
meanors The category of felony or misdemeanor is 
identified by the Court s verdict and cannot be deter-
mined from the penalty imposed 
3 Felonies and the most serious class of misde-
meanor assessed by other state and federal courts 
may have different labels, but Section 35-4-5(b)(2) 
disqualifications can still be assessed on Utah claim-
ants based upon equivalent convictions 
4 Criminal acts other than crimes of dishonesty 
which result in conviction on Class B or C misde-
meanors can only be used to determine benefit eligi-
bility under Section 35-4-5(b)(l) 
R475-5b-204. Admission or Conviction in a 
Court. 
1 An admission is a voluntary' acknowledgement 
made b\ a claimant that he has committed acts which 
are in violation of the law In this context, tne admis-
sion may be a verbal or written statement b\ the 
claimant that he committed the act The admission 
does not necessarily have to be made to a Department 
representative However, there must be sufficient in-
formation to establish that the admission was made 
and that it was not a false statement given under 
duress or made to obtain some concession 
a If the claimant makes a valid admission to a 
criminal act involving dishonest\ resulting in a dis-
charge for which he was not prosecutea a penalty 
under Section 35-4-5(b)(2) can still be assessed 
b If an admission is made to any other disqualify-
ing crime not involving dishonesty, resulting m a 
discharge for which he was not prosecuted the De-
partment must determine the probable penalty under 
the Utah criminal code to decide whether a disqualifi-
cation will be assessed under Section 35-4-5(bXl) or 
5(b)(2) 
2 A conviction is when a claimant has been found 
guilty by a court of committing an act which ic in 
violation of the law When the claimant pleads "no 
contest" or agrees to a diversionary program as pro-
vided by the court, this is treated, for the purposes of 
this section of the Act, the same as a conviction 
R475-5b-205. Benefits Held in Abeyance. 
1. For a crime involving theft or a felony or Class 
A misdemeanor, the law requires a withholding of a 
determination of eligibility if the claimant has not 
made an admission but is held in legal custody or is 
free on bail Benefits cannot be paid unless a determi-
nation of eligibility is made Failure to pav benefits 
even though the burden of proof for a denial under 
Section 5(b)(2) has not been met is justified because 
the court in holding the claimant in legal custody or 
establishing bail has made a preliminary ruling that 
the state has established that a crime has been com-
mitted and there is reason to believe the individual 
committed that crime The filing of charges is not the 
same as being held in custody or being free on bail 
2 However, if there is a preponderance of evidence 
that the act was committed, a denial of benefits 
should be made under Section 35-4-5(b)(l), if charges 
have not been filed by the employer within four 
weeks In such a case, the decision under Section 
35-4-5(b)(l) will advise the claimant that a decision 
under Section 35-4-5(b)(2* is still pending and the 
5^b)(l) disqualification shall be changed to a 5(b)(2) 
disqualification if the claimant is found guilty by the 
court If the claimant has purged a 5(b)(1) disqualifi-
cation but a Section 5(b)(2) disqualification is possible 
pending a ruling by the court, benefits must be held 
in abevance until the court reacnes the verdict The 
claimant has the responsibility to provide the Depart-
ment with the courts verdict in order to establish 
eligibility 
3 If a determination of eligibility is held in abev-
ance the claimant must be notified in a written deci-
sion that benefits are being withheld in accordance 
with Section 35-4-5(b)(2) pending a determination by 
the court Tne claimant has the right to appeal the 
holding of his benefits in abeyance 
R475-5b-206. Disqualification Period. 
The 52-week disqualification period for Section 
5(b)(2) will begin effective with the week of discharge 
even if thi^ is before the effective date of the claim In 
addition, the disqualification continues until the 
claimant has returned to work in bona fide covered 
employment and earned six times his weekh benefit 
amount after the week in which he was discharged 
Tne claimant must provide proof of this employment 
and earnings and be otherwise eligible for benefits A 
disqualification which begins in one benefit year will 
continue into a new benefit year until the 52-week 
disqualification has ended and the claimant has suffi-
cient subsequent earnings 
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R475-5c. Failure to Apply for or Ac-
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R475-5c-9 Suitability of Work 
R475-5c-10 Examples 
R475-5c-ll. New Work. 
R475-5c-12 Burden of Proof 
R475-5c-13. Period of Ineligibility. 
R475-5c-14 Notification 
JOB* 
satva* 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
CLAIM FOR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
f<» PRIVACY ACT NOTICE M 
U N E M P L O Y M E N T INSURANCE 
CLAIMANT GUIDE PLEASE PRINT LEGIBLY 
>-< "»ML QMIZ__m. Fuller ton 
.1 . . M -MiiHi A MifW.e m.ttall 
MA . •». , A D D M K Y > 
7 ^ ? #. $L>flLtitJ?L.-£AZr: 
titer sofa*. UXAA LHP&H-2>vCoct 
O f H f M N A M C USLD.M...OHO etc i 
PHONE 
omcemeoMiY 
6 0 1 - \ l O U t SOI* ' -
WT/L AOOX REOP 
cT D a 
D a a 
PHONC/ , 
ADDRESS 
£e**-J±-4*S£Ufi SOOAL 8 f NUMBER 
a H/ivo you applied 1o» or roceived unemployment benefits from 
a n / othiu st.ito or the railroad retirement board within the last 12 
months9 
h M.tvu you applied lor or are you roceivmg Social Security or any 
omor fype of tetifernent or disability retirement pay? 
c Have vou received or are you entitled to receive separation 
ac ciued vacation pay or wages «n lieu ot notice from any 
empio»ei''
 mmm 
d A»« yon an otlicer o! a corporation a contractor sett-
employed or do you own or operate a farm7 
YES N O 
• ET 
D Hf 
EfD 
D &r 
ENTER YOUR U S T JOB ON LINE 1. WRITE "NONE" IF YOU HAVE NOT WORKED SINCE YOU LAST F t t t D FOR M N t F t T t , 
EMPLOYER WORK SHE'PAYROLL ADORCSS 
N««me of Company (Last Jot)) location of • , j* 
) 0 NOT WRITE «N THIS BOX Owner Of C DO corporate name (tt oNftereot) 
Ctty St»W» 
.££_ 
DATES W O * K £ D 
\k 1 k 
J a a - S t . 
si 
3 Z 
«J 
SEPARATION 
\ LAYOFF 
l - - d u n 
5 JkLFlRED 
4 STRIKE 
1 RETIRED 
B 
LIST ALL EMPLOYMENT FOR THE PAST 24 MONTHS THAT DOES NOT APPEAR ON THE PRELIMINARY 0CTOWWNAT1OH. 
7 U in.e of Company Location of 
Work (State) 
J . -
j J^WjUfeLML.- i 
S*»«t (vpOboi 
DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BOX » Owner or corporate name flf different) 
C«ty Sui« 
u 
IS r 
2x-
JttL 
IE: 
J O . 
u , ; t, 
3Z 
B 1 LAYOFF 
2 QUIT 
1 FtREO 6 0 S D 
4 STPVKI 
ft RETIRED 
• OTHER 
3 U.»me of Company Location of 
Work (State) 
DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BOX j Owner or corporate name (H d i l u e n t ) 
S<f*«lo< P O Bo* 
City $KM\+ J3U 
-De* , 
JMCL. s : 
». LAYOFF B 
2. ourr 
3, FIRED 606 0 
4. BTRKE 
*- RETIRED 
* OTHER SHAD 
CERTIFICATION 
SIGNED J 7 _ _ / - / * * * 
I have reviewed my preliminary determination and have added all rmssmg employers I claim benefit! under the U t i h Employment 
Security Act l understand tha/ the tawyprovides penalties of fine a * d imprisonment lor falsa statements to secure benefit*. 
SIGNATURE ^S^tCkJt _ R E P R . _ 
) 0 N O T WRITE BELOW THIS U N E REPR. N O . - SZJ3 
EFF DATS j A 0 (SUNDAY) 1 C V 
LAST DAY 
^l\p</\fi$\<?> 
LO - ^ $ _ 
CUR WK 5. 
CNTY 
JOR CONTACTS 0. 1 
±1 
OEPERRED TO | 
(SATURDAY) | 
SCHOOL TO | 
(SATURDAY,! 
WORK COMP j 
(SUNDAY, [ _ 
0 3 4, 5 IP c£ . DEFERRAL 
J.S.U.D , 
CLAIM NOTE 
OPTIONAL 
606 MESSAGE 
Jft 
RCODE 
NON-SEP 
STOP 
SEND NO 
603 
ITT 
J 
&4L 
P R O G A M ) ft 
OD214 0 1 
RET1R S P U C 0 M 0 
TERMINATE DENIAL 
LAW I 
SECTION, 
^ i i fry,
 m . ; — i r v ^ : ^ 
r42 8oaceal **'% 
DEDS 
BEG 
DATE 
(SUN) 
r w ^ opacea MaJomum|_^ * *\ t -AZ^/% $£:' 
1
 •••' ^
 v . E N Q . < w • • i I £• i «i ii!l• i H i i '<i>V 
Name. 
Form 6S0»T1 
tor " / f _ , _ j ^ uuto Department ol Employment 8ecurtty 
CLAIMANT STATEMENT OF J O I DISCHARGE 
FIRST PAGE 
'•'LM 
READ SEPOftE COMPLETtNO THIS FORM: It you were discharged from your Job. you may be denied bene*** 
under the law. Your benefits will be denied if It is determined that you were discharged for "Just cauae" or tor 
committing a crime in connection with your work. Just cause Is established It: (1) You knew the conduct your 
employer expected. (2) Your employer could have been harmed by your actions. (3) The action causing your 
discharge was within your control. The Information you provide and which is provided by your employer will be 
used to maks the decision on your eligibility. 
Please state whatectualty happened, not conclusions or assumptions. Use the reverse side If you need more spec*. 
You may be denied benefits H you do not pwrtde adsquets Intomiotto* 
1. Company Name ALftrwn& Phone Uo.rrf? ?°°° HoykK>gempk>yed?_ZLlI 
Last date worked 6 ^ 3 ~ ^ X Type of work performed VCCt t t / l r l j Pay rale \\tl° ~~ 
Name and title of person who discharged you 
2. What w u the "final incident'* that caused your employer to discharge you? Explain in detail, uaing the reverse aide 
If necessary. 
Had this happened before? | / f Yes [ J No If "Yea." when? 
A (MS fWtflY-
What harm or potential harm did your action cause your employer? — f t vT ktlU^, fl 
What could you have *or*5 to prevent the incident or situation which caused your discharge? ____________ 
be flcr mAjQ { r f <<? \ i 
J. Were you discharged ( ] Immediately? [ ) At end of shift? M M O T S than one day later? 
What reason were you given? <\\C\<j\ n<3 COM^CL»-wj jj/p.*r / u 
I. Had your employer told you to change or improve your conduct before you were discharged? f/fYea ( ] No 
If "Yea," what were you told? <r~>*\ ' ICfCw) L_J_Li. 
EXHIBIT *?. 
How (varbal, written or both)? \K ( nto \ When (show date(sl)? 
T 1 T 1 T 1 T 1 T 1 T 1 T 1 - • « - - - • - • • 
FonnMO-TS 
JOB 
SBMCE £ Utah Depertnwrt of Emptoymant Sacurtty CLAIMANT S T A T t M I M T OF J O i DISCHARGE SECOND PAOE 
Name 6^ «^  k m f W ^ v / ^ S3* fjfj'ff'tffl? 
U t t THE OTHER MOB IP YOU NfEO MORI EPACE PON YOUR ANSWER* 
5. Hyouwere dlectorgedfc* violating a coinc«ny policy,whatwaa this policy? ^ r f (\t±ft\uy?m ^fjt^t^hj 
i policy? ,,. 
.poltey? Afa i»*Ci$&t f J f ^ f r O / •] 
Is this a verbal or written p licy  
How did you violate this | 
Did you know before about this policy? 
Have othar amptoyaaa baan fired bafora lor tha aama raaaoo? 
6. H you were diKteroed for attembncaprobla^ 
Briefly explain your reasons for miaairtg work. 
H 4 « UNO 
| ) Y e i W N o 
7. Ware you discharged for any alleged illegal activity? 
tf "Yes." what activity? 
| ) Y e e ( ] N o 
Have you bean charged with a crime related to your oTacharge? 
If "Yes." what is the current status of thia charge? 
UYta ()No 
Have you admitted guilt or been convicted In court of tha activity which wee related to your dteeharge? ( J Yea tJNo 
If "Yes," where and whan? , 
8. Whet other information would you like to present to thla Department to be considered in a dedetc* on vow ee$feEfty?_-
*a*-n*tf*9 Enter a telephone number whsce youcanbafaocfwdpapenaadiiiof^afiipfawawaii on M a 
IrequeatanlntetMewappoinlmanfontite vf I requeal twt my a l f t t y be toMad wto wo ti 
I CERTIFY the information on these pages is true, correct and complete. I have made theee statements to obtain 
unemployment benefits knowing that the law provides penalties for false statements or withholding material facta. 
D m ' / - ? - ? * Signature
 m A ^ f ^ - ^ j J x t ^ " 
DO MOT wwmr aaxow TH» uwt 
I J Interview ^ A P O t>fftebuttal Offered ( ) Not Needed 
( J Allowed (DE. DA) ^ < Denied (DD. DC) ( J AbevanaMLT) Sac. £$V/Y Bl.j22*£j35& 
I ] Charged (BC.OC.SC.BR. OR. OS) iM^Not Charged (BN^>N, SN. BR. Ofl. OS) ( ) Abeyance ( IT) 
Culpability: 
IX. ATTENDANCE, STATUS ANO P A f: 
1. Due to the perishable nature of many of the commodities, and in order to prevent spoilage and to meet delivery and 
production schedules, ail employees must report to work as scheduled. 
2. When unable to report to work, call )n aut hcmntiy in advance of the snm 10 enable your supervisor to provide a 
replacement Absence without advising your supervisor or manager will be considered as voluntary resignation. 
3 Report to work on time. Record all time worked on your time card. Erppioyee must review and agree to comply with 
the Company's stated Time Clock Policy and Procedures, 
4. It is your own responsibility to keep informed of when you will be expected to work. Work schedules will be posted 
near the time clock. 
5 Advise your immediate" supervisor promptly of any change in name, address, telephone number^ marital status, or 
number of dependents, so the Company and internal Revenue records may be kept current. 
Xi CAUSES FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL 
The following acts will not be tolerated and will be considered sufficient cause tor immediate discharge: 
1 Drinking intoxicants, or the use or possession of any illegal stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic substance, on' 
Company premises at any time, whether on or off shift, or reporting to work under the effect of intoxicants, or any1; 
illegal stimulant, or hallucinogenic substance. 
2 Excessive tardiness, or absence without proper reason or notice to management 
3. Proven immoral or illegal behavior on Company premises. 
4 Any fraudulent act or statement directly related to Company business^ 
5 Excessive wage attachments or harrassment of the Company byyouV unpaid creditors. 
6 Unauthorized possession of or damage to Company funds, property, or merchandise! 
7. Quarreling or fighting with other employees. 
& r Mishandling of Company funds or property. Any employee willfully damagtng Company property, or breaking and/or 
removing from the Company"premises, any merchandise for the purpose of eating or pilferage, will be subject to 
immediate termination. All merchandise leaving the warehouse or plant must be accompanied by an invoice. 
9 Gambling on Company property, 
10 insubordination, falsifying records, disclosing confidential information, or any other a d constituting willful disregard 
of the Company* s best interest/ 
XI. BONDING* AU employees must be bonded The premium involved shall be paid by the Company. In the event the Com-
pany's regular bonding company refuses to give bond to any employee tor any reason, then and in that event, the 
employee will be subject to immediate termination. 
XU. CHAUFFEUR'S LICENSES' AU driver-warehousemen will be required to have a valid Chauffeur's License in the states 
where they are required and for the state where the plant or distribution center is located, within fifteen (15) days after 
they are employeed. After fifteen (15) days of employment, all driver-warehousemen must at all times have a valicT 
Chauffeur's license. The license must be earned with them at ail times. No exceptions will be made. 
XIII PASSENGERS No dnver-warehouseman will allow anyone, other than employees of the employer who are on duty, 
to ride on his truck. This will not prohibit the dnver-warehouseman from picking up other drivers, helpers, or others in 
wrecked or broken down motor equipment and transportmo them to the first available point of communication, repair,' 
lodging, or available medical attention. 
XIV. COMPANY (MAGE Aff actions by employees reflect upon the image o(Att>ertson% Inc., and In your deatings with the 
public, you should at ail times conduct yourself in a manner that is beyond reproach This includes being cautious of, 
your actions in public, your dress and personal appearance, driving habits, language, etc. 
\ hereby certify that I have read and understand the above Distribution and Manufacturing policies; and that in connection with 
the application for employment with, continued employment by, or advancement with Albertson's, Inc*, I have been advised 
through receipt of this form that: 
1* An investigative consumer report as to my character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of 
living may be made and, 
2. I have the nght to make a written request within a reasonable time for a complete and accurate disclosure of the, 
nature and scope of the investigation requested. 
I also acknowledge that any report or other information required by Federal or State law nowvr hereafter in affect shall be 
deemed received by me if addressed to me at my last known addressT 
Signature _ L J ll Zl 1 1 — Witness by Supervisor ^ < V / ? iirnrt 
Distribution Center or Plants 
. . . 000008 
Original - Personnel Fife 1st Copy - Employee 2nd Copy -' n T r n T r f T fltcord Folter 
^ v i c e & S a v / ^ 
January 31, 1990 
TO: 
FROM: 
SUBJECT: 
Gayle Fullerton 
v. 
Kirk Hansen 
SUSPENSION (WILLFUL DISTRUCTION OF COMPANY PROPERTY) 
On Sunday January 28, 1990 you willfully kicked in the door to the warm-up 
room. Due to this type of behavior on your party you are placed on a 
Disciplinary Suspension for the period of two weeks without pay beginning 
January 31, 1990 thru February 14, 1990. You will report back to work at 
your regularly scheduled start time February 15, 1990. Any further 
incidents of this nature will result in your termination. 
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HENDERSON 
JUDGE 
KIM) 
JUDGE 
KTDD 
JUDGE 
KTDD 
JUDGE 
KIDD 
JUDGE 
KIDD 
JUDGE 
will be represented by Diane Henderson. There may be several witnesses 
who will identity themselves at the time that they're sworn. 
The Department of Employment Security's decision dated April 29th, 1992 
denied the payment of unenployment benefits to the claimant effective 
April 5th, 1992, and awarded the errployer relief of charges on the 
grounds the claimant was discharged for disqualifying just cause. His 
appeal filed May 4th, 1992 was tiirely. 
Since there are no procedural questions, we'll go directly to testimony; 
and I assume that you wish to have this gentleman called as your first 
witness, Ms. Henderson, is that correct? 
Yes. 
Would you raise your right hand to be sworn? 
OATH AEMINISTERED. Employer witness answered in the affirmative. 
Thank you, sir. If you'd state your name and position with the company, 
please? 
Darrel Kidd; Warehouse Operations Manager, at Albertsons Distribution in 
North Salt lake. 
And hew long have you been in that capacity? 
One and a-half (1 1/2) years. 
And with ycur job or in your job capacity, were you the direct 
supervisor of Mr. Fullerton? 
Not directly. 
Did you dismiss him? 
Yes, I did. 
Okay. And do you have firsthand knowledge with respect to the 
occurrences or are you testifying from what others have told you and 
company records? 
From what others have told me and company records. 
We shew that he was employed with Albertsons, then, from April 5th of 
1981 to April 3rd of '92, is that correct? 
KEDD Thatfs correct. 
3 
JUEGE And his job title at separation? 
KEDD Forklift operator. 
JUDGE And his rate of pay, if you know it? 
KEDD Uh, eleven ten (11.10)? 
CLAIMANT Yeah. 
JUDGE And was this a full or part-time position? 
KEDD Full time. 
JUDGE And what caused the job to end, was this a quit or a discharge? 
KEDD Discharge. 
JUDGE And what were the reasons that you gave him that you were dismissing 
him? 
KEDD Willful destruction of ccanpany property. 
JUDGE And what specifically does that mean? 
KEEO Vfe believe that he purposely caused damage to one of the forklifts, it 
was not by accident. 
JUDGE And you don't have firsthand knowledge of this, is that correct? 
KIDD I did not witness the incident, no. 
JUDGE Okay. Hew did you make your decision to dismiss him? 
KIDD Based on past records of similar nature and testimonies given to me by 
the individual who witnessed the incident. 
JUDGE By "past record of similar nature", what do you mean by that? 
YICD On January 31st of 1990, Gayle was suspended for willful destruction of 
company property* He kicked a—an office door and broke it. 
JUDGE Were you the person that interviewed him at that time? 
KIDD Yes, I was. 
JUDGE And did you see what had occurred? 
KEIDD I did not witness it, personally. 
4 
JUDGE Okay. What was the discussion between the two of ycu? 
KIDD I told him that I had heard f ran others on his crew that he had kicked 
in the door; and he told me that he had, that he was just messing 
around. He didn't mean to break it. 
JUDGE Okay. Any other occurrence? 
KTDD In April of 1989, — 
JUDGE That's a way long time ago; did that have anything to do with your 
decision? 
KIDD It was part of the eanoployee's record, which was not directly related to 
this incident; however, it was just part of his past history. 
JUDGE Okay. Tell me about that? 
KIDD He was suspended for unsafe operation of equipment, at which time he'd 
been employed for approximately eight (8) years. The incident, he 
tipped over the forklift in which he was operating, for going around a 
corner too fast. 
JUDGE And did you interview him at that time? 
KIDD Yes, I did. 
JUDGE And tell me the conversation. 
KIDD It was tcwards the end of the shift. He told me that he was in a hurry. 
His mast (?) was still up in the air and he had just made (inaudible 
portion of tape. Did not record properly.) — as long as he'd been 
operating that type of equipment, yeah. He should have been using more 
safe methods to operate the equipment, and I didn't feel that he should 
have tipped it over. 
JUDGE Okay. Anything else that you wish to add or state? 
KIDD No. 
JUDGE Thank you. Any questions you have of him? 
HENDERSON Yes. Mr. Kidd, what is Albertsons1 policy, employee policy on willful 
destruction of company property? 
KIDD On the company policy that the employee signs when they hire on, section 
10, number 8. Section 10 is "CAUSES FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL". And 
number 8 states: 
5 
Mishandling of Company funds or property. Any ertployee 
willfully damaging Company property, or breaking and/or 
removing from the Company premises . . . 
HENDERSON And is that cause for immediate dismissal? 
KIDD Yes, it is. 
HENDERSON Okay. Your Honor, the employer has submitted a packet of documents. 
JUDGE It's marked as Exhibit 4. 
HENDERSON Okay. 
JUDGE Did you get a copy of these documents? 
CLAIMANT Yes, I did. 
JUDGE Okay. 
HENDERSON And we'd also like to submit the warning that Mr. Kidd has testified, 
from January 31st, and from April 18th. 
JUDGE Ihe one April, I prefer to go in chronological order; so the one dated 
April 19th of '89 has been marked as Exhibit 5. Ihe one that's dated 
January 31st of '90 is marked as Exhibit 6. And I'll need more 
information on that one. I'm not entering them into the record right 
new. I'm just identifying them. 
HENDERSON Okay. Mr. Kidd, did you—do you have the dollar amount of damage that 
was caused by the final incident where you made the decision to 
discharge? 
KIDD I believe it was $168 and something cents. Approximately $169. 
HENDERSON Okay. I have no further questions of Mr. Kidd. 
JUDGE Ihank you. Any questions you have, sir? 
SPENCER Yes. Darrel, in regards to the 1990 incident and the 1992 incident, you 
didn't personally witness either of those incidences, but relied totally 
upon the testimony of others, is that correct? 
KIDD Ihe testimony of others and his previous record, yes. 
SPENCER Okay. Is there a union contract in effect between Albertsons and 
Teamsters Local 222 that covers the warehouse employees? 
6 
FT u s It was early morning, I was working graveyard shift at the time. He 
walked in to ask for a battery change, and I told him I'd be ri#it 
there. I got up and wiped my hands to walk out, by that time he'd 
already pushed the other battery back in. He had trouble putting the 
retaining plate in and started beating on the machine. I asked him to 
stop; he wouldn't stop. I told him, I said, "ycu break that cover, I'm 
gonna have to turn you in". His response then was, "I don't give a 
shit, go ahead and turn me in. It'll be the last thing you ever do". 
JUDGE And what happened? 
FT ITS He beat on it a couple more times then—then left. 
JUDGE Did it break? 
FTTTS Yes, it did. 
JUDGE Okay. Then what did you do? 
FT ITS As soon as my supervisor came in, I reported the incident. 
JUDGE Okay, thank you. Ms. Henderson. 
HENDERSON Yes. You testified that Mr. Fullerton came and asked you to help him 
replace the battery. Hew long was it from the time he asked you to help 
him replace the battery until the time you witnessed him banging the 
battery on the plate? 
KT.TTS Certainly less than a minute. 
HENDERSON Less than a minute? 
ELLIS Uh-hram. 
HENDERSON And is it your job duty to help assist with — 
ELLIS To assist 'em, right. 
HENDERSON Okay. Would it be normal—would it be protocol for the claimant to try 
and change the battery by himself? 
KTJiTS It happens; yes, mafam. 
HENDERSON Okay. Did ycu see where the claimant was standing, the claimant being 
Mr. Fullerton, where he was standing at the time? 
ELLIS He was standing on the rack. 
HENDERSON Can you describe what the rack is? 
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ELLIS 
The battery rack is a platform made of steel with rollers through the 
center of it. Well, alcng each side of the frame, in between the frame 
that the battery rolls in and out on. 
Did you see the claimant standing on the rollers at all? 
Yes, I did. 
On the rollers, themselves? 
Well, on the platform, next to the—The rollers is in between the frame, 
and the frame's on the outside. 
Okay. How much does a battery weigh, one of these batteries? 
Between 1500 and 1800, I'm not really positive on that, pounds. 
Okay. Would it be normal procedure for someone to stand on rollers to 
change this battery? 
No, ma'am. 
And why would that—why wouldn't that be? 
They roll extremely freely. They would need to be able to push 
saxething of that weight. 
Okay. Is this a picture of the frame that was broken? 
Of the cover, yes, fiberglass cover. 
Okay. Your Honor, we didn't submit this; but just for your visual aid. 
Has he seen this? 
No. 
I think he needs to see it first. (Pause) Continue. 
We don't intend to submit this, this is the only copy. It's just for a 
visual aid for the—for the look of the frame. 
Okay. At any time when you asked the claimant to stop hitting the 
frame, did he tell you he had slipped or did he provide any excuse for 
what he was doing? 
No. 
11 
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HENDERSON Okay. No further questions. 
JUDGE Thank you. Any questions you have, Mr. Spencer? 
SPENCER Yes. I'd like to get into a little more detail on hew this—this 
battery is switched. You say it weighs between 1500 and 1800 pounds, 
Earl? 
ELLIS Yes. 
SPENCER Hew do they get it out of the forklift onto the floor or onto the 
platform, isn't there a ridge or a lift of seme sort? 
FT u s There's no ridge or no lift; the reach truck pulls alongside of the 
frame of the battery rack. The frame of the—I mean, the battery 
cotpartment of the reach truck's got rollers in it. The same as the 
frame for the battery holder. They push the battery out frcro one set of 
rollers in the reach truck to the set of rollers on the—the battery 
exxrpartment. 
JUDGE Who's—who's "(t)hey"? 
ELLIS Either the driver or myself. 
JUDGE Oh, okay. Thank you. 
ELLIS I assist 'em or they assist me. It takes two to do it because you've 
got to move the battery rack back and forth, which is on rollers also. 
SPENCER And this is—Hew long does this procedure normally take? 
ELLtS Well, it don't take very long at all; did it? 
SPENCER You stated it—it was less than a minute and he had already switched the 
battery, and then he started beating on the (unintelligible). 
ELLIS He'd already pushed it in, yes. 
SPENCER He had taken the old battery out — 
ELLIS Before he came into the Maintenance Shop to get me, he'd already pushed 
the old battery out. 
SPENCER Okay. Approximately hew many times did you see him physically barg on 
this battery caper (sic)—cover? 
ELLIS I didn't count it, but it was several times. 
12 
SPENCER You stated that it was—that Mr. Fullerton had broken the—the cover. 
Wasn't that cover broken prior to the incident? 
ELLIS No, sir. It was a brand new cover. 
SPENCER Then what was the problem with sliding the cover or the — 
ELLIS Retaining plate in? 
SPENCER — the retaining plate in? 
TTITS The battery had to be held over slightly because it, like I say, the 
rollers roll extremely freely and if the frame hit the—the floor's not 
even, which it's not, the battery will roll a little bit. I held it 
over for him to put the cover in, I mean to put the retaining plate in, 
by that time he'd already broke the cover on it. 
SPENCER Why would he beat on the cover of the forklift when it had nothing to do 
with moving the battery one direction or another, in your opinion? 
ELLIS He had a rough day. 
SPENCER Are you familiar with Albertsons' progressive discipline policy; I guess 
what I'm trying to ask here is, did you expect Mr. Fullerton to be 
terminated from this incident? 
ELLIS No, I didn't. 
SPENCER What would have been the normal procedure in your estimation? 
ELLIS I would have suspected he would have got suspended. I didn't think he 
would get fired; but, then again, I did not knew his past history 
either. 
SPENCER Okay. Thank you, Mr. Ellis; that's all I've got. 
JUDGE Thank you. Anything else you have? 
HENDERSON Yes. Based on the last question, did ycu play any part in the decision 
to terminate? 
ELLIS Definitely not. 
HENDERSON Are you a supervisor, at all, of Mr. Fullerton? 
ELLIS No. 
HENDERSON Okay. No further questions. 
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HENDERSO: 1 
Let me ask you, si: ,. ..:,•: ^ ;^^ : 
the reta i n — 
ne piat^. or the cover, or 
r
 - riant, bene is the fiberglass cover that he broke.. Ihey donft have 
i* picture of the place. The picture of the plate is a piece of metal 
3/16*3 of an incn thick, 4" tall, and about 12" long1. 
It's ;;u:3t a very lightweight piece of material. 
-o any of these pictures shew 'where 'the battery is actually 
located on the equipment? 
Wei], vot /ery clear] y It's directly underneath this. irwii in this 
portion, down here. 
Ok.-n r -.: , what, j"i 1st supports the battery? 
Yes.. The plate goes, right in — 
Ct! cay. so the battery fits here and the plate just holds it in place. 
Rj gilt, r i <«./ ; - n • 
Okay. Any problems the two of you have ever had? 
No. 
j^i} ^ \ < you, Anyone t.se you neec -o ca3 1 ? 
Yd. -^ , >>cotx Bradshaw* 
1,1
 « -^ • -exami ne, d i dn't I? 
Yes. 
Okay, sorry. Okay Next one? 
AT id w . i A*6 ;ieed Mr. Bradshaw? 
He was the claimant's direct supervisor and he actuallv rerformed the 
discharge. 
I dot !ft : - -
And I nterviewed him as to "'what his story was as. to what had happened,, 
14 
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JUDGE Oh, c >kay Be :i i c:ji it I :x »< ::) :: (OFF RECORD) 
We1 re back;, on record. No testimony was taken or given during the tine 
that we were off record, I si up] y went and got Mr'. Bradshaw. Would you 
agree, Mr. Spencer? 
SPENCER Yes. 
JUDGE Thank ) cii Would you agree, Ms, Henderson? 
HENDERSON Yes. 
JUDGE Thank you. You've been call ed, to testify, sir. Would, you raise your 
right hand,,? 
OATH AEMD^LSTERED. v~ Bradshaw answered in, the affirmative. 
Ttiar> you, ;*-. " * you'd state your name and position? 
ERADSI JAW *> <v .*.-!::;•:.., : *v. *i Superintendei it of Albertsons. 
JUDGE • Okay «rc <^> su ;:. ^ore the direct supervisor of Mr. Fullerton? 
BRADSHAW Yes. 
JUDGE Ana , *:, .wo you been h...- 2 irect supervi sor? 
BRADSHAW A couple years, - v 
JUDGE Okay. .. *• m u111 hi i aspect In what uxunred with the 
forkliiu". 
W<ADSHAW Yes. 
JUDGE Okay, And tell me when the .incident occurred and when, you, talked to 
him? 
BRADSHAW The date, 1 don't have exactly. Itfs written on the letters. 
JUDGE Okay. 
BRADSHAW I called him in after LaVell James had approached me and told me what 
Earl had told him. Ard that's when I called Mr. Fullerton in, and we 
talked abcxit it; and it started, out 'where, he denied anything, as far as 
involvement with the battery, or the lid, or whatever. And we proceeded 
to tell him about 'what was said, ard what we've heard, and what Earl and 
LaVell had told me. 'Later' he said it was an accident, and 'that it w a s — 
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'had grease on it and it slipped exit of his fingers. Ard tna; was, 
'basically, 1 don't know (pause) 
JUDGE
 A . Anything else you said to him? 
BRADSHAW 
JUDGE W;;>V v \. ~'J ahead, Ms. Henderson? 
HENDERSON" IOU tjestified the conversation that you, had, at any time did 
Mr. Fulierton make the excuse that he was standing on sane rollers and 
had siioped? 
BRADSHAW N o n e . 
HENDERSQI: J" r^r, . ...- y;\, -..:.; _j^t jt u r s t ne Jcrat/; ^nyt:.i:>3 v. JU - h thf 
battery, is t^at all he said or car. you expand on what he said? 
BRADSHAW (Lrujrw^iigiLie, , I j o ; / : ; ; ^; ne ju^t <*cuxi .^.i. he cudn'L Knew nothing 
about it. at f i rs t ; and then as we got into talking ard explaining that— 
that Earl seen him do this and LaVeil told me this, and, that ' s when he 
said :*~ ^r ^ --'-~-idor.*'. 
HENDERSOt I 0- .• -.- _G \ x: rake the decision to discharge the claimant? • 
BRADSHAW N o . 
HENDERSOi I " Jl i\ ud™and wh » *a«_> tliat decision nude by, in peart? 
BRADSHAW' Through Darrel, and I'm sure he had a conference with Boise. 
HENDERSON if " \ N " f i1r1 V' quwt l < ns. 
JUDGE Thank you. Any questions you have, sir? 
SPENCER Scott, during your interview with Mi . u^lerton, I guess during your 
investigative portion, of 'this incident, did Gayle at any time state that 
the battery cover was already broken? 
BRADSHAW (Pause) Uh, no. 
SPENCER And yes- already te-srified that he sa:c he—ne didn't sav an^-thiric about 
starding on the rollers and sliding, -r sl:ppinq, i-r—cr anythina of 
that "S-7,rne? 
BRADSHAW N o , : r r . : >.. : *o. 
SPENCER That's CLL! 
• Thank you. AnythI ng further, Ms. Henderson? . 
HENDERSON No. 
JUDGE Okfl'j. i1 II i I ili1 .in/'Mit; t - l s c 1 LUII your s i d e ? 
HENDERSON No. 
JUDGE Okay, .^^ • • ,1 past alio* J\K> :/C regain here, then ->JLT. ±-±.± go 
ahead and swear -/c^  ,-*, ^ X U G you raj <> ycx;- right hand" 
OATH A04INISTERED. Claimant answered u«- nf; . r.im; .va. 
Ihank you, sir. If you'd state, your nante and current mailing address 
for the record? 
CLAIMMfT Name is Gayle, M. Fullerton. Live at 7669 .South Sunrise. Place in West 
Jordan, Utah,, 
JUDGE ' And your zip code is 84084? 
OiOMANr Yes. 
JUDGE Okay. ^jur^ - uw uie ±O^L uxcitje u i ac you worked pr ion to f i 1 1 ng for 
b e n e f i t s was A ibe r t sons , i s t h a t c o r r e c t ? 
i/IAIMAMl' , • • •: 
JUDGE Okay. And are. you, back to work, at, 'this point? 
CLAIMANT No, not yet. 
i/-LXJL Okay. You've heard the enplqyer state, your dates of employment, type of 
work you were' doing, hours and wage; is that 'Correct, to the best., of your 
knowledge? 
OIATMANT W s . 
JUDGE And "would,, you, agree that thi s is a discharge rather' than, a voluntary 
quit? 
CIAIMANT Yes. 
JUDGE Oka\. And what were 'the reasons that you were told that you wcn;i loincj 
dismissed? 
Q^JJ^I^JI p o r ^ ^- i r t^^^ Q £ oonparry property W:i ] Ifii] ] y destructi i >g. 
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JUDGE 
CLAIMANT 
JUDGE 
cmmOT 
.I1JDGE 
JUDGE 
CAIMANT 
CLAIMANT 
JUDGE 
CLAIMANT 
JUDGE 
niAIMAMI 
JUDGE 
CLAIMANT 
Okay, I assume that that has tx> 
truck, is that correct? 
Yes. 
do with the damaged forklifi reach 
All ri'iht , Wfru ui"i+ ri did t h i s nmi r i dn ynu n^mnter t]ip> datP9 
(No audible response) 
Calendar help you at all? 
(I ong pause) 
If you donft, thatfs ok<i. T ' ./* 
It's— ,:i tfs the, date that was stated on the report, I believe. 
About Apri ] 2nd : 
Yeah. 
Oka;} Wt la t hap: ened? 
I went in "to get a, tottery change ard it was, I believe, afternoon not 
morning. And,, I went in to ask Earl to come and help me. And I went out 
and I waited. It 'wasn't one minute; it was at least five (5) minutes. 
And I have a quota to keep; so I just 'book it upon nr/self to change 'the 
battery. I kicked the battery out. I—I switched batteries, and I 
pushed the fresh battery back in; and the batteries sit on rollers. And 
therefs no way you can push !em in wi thout standing on, those rollers, 
There's just no other way to do it. And usually you use the rollers as 
a brace to—to get enough force behind the battery, because they are so 
big and heavy, to push It in. And a ':ot of tines, you know, you—you 
need help to do that. H.r, l*ve had a lot of experience at it; so I got 
the battery back in and b\ this time Earl had coie out. And, to ire, he 
seeired, like he was in a bad mood because. I believe they had just got a 
butt chewing frcro—because they weren't keeping the machines in good 
operating order. 'Cause we were always having lifts break dewn and, it 
was holding us up on our production. So he, to ire, seemed to be in a 
bad way. 
What made y%,, th:nk 
Beeaus* \p ! iHort lA.JJ".pi.CHi. 
AnytMng he did or said tha t nade v K. - link t J e t ? 
Uh, I can ' t ren^rixr exactly ^ast l r..td t ha t impression. That wa s the • 
impression : \~ -\ * * c->xactly remember what was. said 
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JUDGE 
QAIMANr 
JUDGE 
CLAIMANT 
It's not clear. Rut I tried to put the plate on, and T—I couldn't C.K " 
it in there. Arid I was tired, a little bit tired frcir. pushing it in; 
I stood up, t:c Kind of catch my brtvith, I had the p]/»r- in my han. 
which is a pretty heavy piece of ::* * /. r -^ Mri. it.1--. :.t tc nolo -
1500-pound battery inside of there; so it's—it's a pretty good-sized 
piece of metal. And when I stood up, I was on this—on the north side 
of the lift and. Earl was on the south side. And he was knelt down, I 
don't knew if he was trying to hold the battery in or what; but he 
couldn't see my feet. He was on the other side of the lift. When I 
stood up, I slipped an the roller, that are. somewhat oily anyway. And 
as I—1 grabbed for my balance, I—1 brought the plate down onto the 
lift. It chipped it a .1 i ttl e ti ny fai t and i t, i n no way, broke the—the 
plastic. 
When tfidt. happened, the plastic *a^ p^cviou^Iy orx^ keri n^. when you put 
a pallet ;»way, you back out, sometimes the lift will go underneath the 
racks and that's hew the—the cover was broken. It was already broken 
in the first place. And, you know, it it. cones down to it, 1—there—I 
YJX** There's some workers that I work with that could testify to that. 
And tney saw what happened after I had dropped—fallen or. it with the 
plate and it—it did not break it. And—and, basically tnat!s what 
happened. Then 1—1 put the plate in, and just left. 
0r„, yes, he saic. rif you do that agai* 
I have no, you rj>c**, problem with r>.: 
I just thought H- W ^ i>^f +-^ "ivirf-: 
seriou..-. 
: ' - gonna turn you,,, in"; but I — 
I've got along with, him, well. 
T didn't knew fp was reall y 
JUD3E 
CI AIMANT 
W h a t d o y o u Xl\\\\\ Ii< Wia <y >niq i "" I 11111 yi nJ 111 I > 11 , i 
a g a i n ? 
'i HI i 1 hi I Wt ld t 
He—-he assumed ^ L^I. . • *.\ + . *xiu.i destruction. He didn-u KTJCW 'that I 
slipped. He couldn't haw kr>cvn !cause he couldn't see my feet. But., 
apparently, he assumed that I willfully did it; but I didr.'t know that. 
I just thought he was just talking, 'cause we 'talk a lot at work. I 
didn't take him serious; and—and I just said, "go ahead if you do"—I 
didn't say, I don't give a, shit,, I didn't say that. I said, "go ahead. 
If you do, it'll be the last thing you ever do", just talking. I wasn't 
serious. I didn't knew he was serious. Because I joke around with my 
fellcw wort-cars that way. And I—I wasn't—I didn't intentionally 
threaten him in a—in a way—in that way. And apparently he—he 
understood it that .way, and that's what became of th<=> situation. He did 
turn me in. 
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HENDERSON Y e s . 
JUDGE 
HENDERSON 
We've discussed Exhibits 5 and 6. 
Mr. E l l i s , i s t:r^t correct? 
Yes. 
I assume Exhibit 7 was written by 
JUDGE 
CLAIMANT 
JUDGE 
HENDERSON 
JUDGE 
SI'DICER 
JUDGE . 
Wliat's been marked as Exhibit 8A and B is the Claimant Statement of Jcb 
Discharge? and I assume that you. prepared and. submitted, that document, 
am I correct, Mr', Fullerton? 
Yes. 
What's been marked as Exhibit 9A and P is a Statement Regarding Claims 
for Benefits dated April 27th; and apparently that was also a telephone 
conversation between you and an adjudicator, is that correct? 
(Pause) 
You need to answer audibly. 
Yes,,, 
Okay. What's been marked as Exhibit IQA is a Decision of Eligibility 
for Unemployment Benefits, that was the denial letter that you 
received. And 10B is 'the employer Notice, of Claimant Eligibility and 
Employer Charges that was sent out to the Gibbens Company, What's been 
marked as Exhibi t 1 3 i s the appeal. 
Any reason that these documents should not. be made part 
from your perspective, Ms. Henderson? 
No. 
Se- record 
Okay cm vour 
I oojeL-w, ioui nuuur, uo 'Exhibits D ana t>. ^ relieve iDeings- new they're 
over a vear old, thev have no relevancy in this natter. 
Okay. I will allcw them into the re-cord. Is 11 also note your 
objection, and they will not be given very much weight. This gentleman 
had already 'testified, that although :'. had some play in nis decision 
making, the main reason he was dismissed for—was what: ^ xxrarred. .April 
2nd; am I correct in my understanding, sir? 
Correct. 
JUDGE Okay. So I111 note your objection, but: I will allow 'them in. And they 
will not be given very much weight. Okay. 
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FT u s He was standing, legs aparr, 1 Ike this, on the. frame of the battery 
rack. Picked up the plate, retaining plate and was striking the cover 
repeatedly. He was mad, for what reason I couldn't tell, but he was 
extremely angry about something. And 1 asked him to stop; he wouldn't 
stop. And when I asked him to step again or I'd turn him in if he broke 
the cover, he would—he went ahead and, f,go—go ahead, I don't give a 
shit". He just, was in a bad. 'mood, that day, extremely bad mood. 
HEJO3RS0N At—You've testified what he sa^d, — i .'n. .^.^ i.jui;, ..1 &\ -^)c pj^ r/L. yoa 
told h im to .step doing" that, did he at any point tell you he didn't 
mean to do that, or -
ELLIS Nb. 
HENDERSON Okay . AJ :d weuv yuj disqnmt li d at dJ I that ijj)1, Wfiie yuui lia\iiM .m IracI 
day or — 
ELLIS . No, 1 was having a gooc ajy„ 
HENDERSON Okay. And your testimony was that he led asked,,, you approximately one 
minute, earlier. 
ELLIS Uh-hmm. 
HENDERSON Ocxxl d „:i t have been f:i /e (5) m i i » ites or a re you fa i n! y sur c 
KTIiTS N o , -o t . a chai'O*^. 
HENDERSON Okay 
EIULS You ^ai; ask anybody in the 'warehouse, I doi 1 't take axtei ried peri ods of 
time to get cut there and change a battery. 
HENDERSON O - have XYJ further quest ions,, 
JUDGE Mr. Spencer? 
SPENCER Mr'. Ell is, when you, cone out of the washroom or—or wherever it was 'that 
you were 'washing your' hands, in what relationship to the forklift and to 
Mr. Fullerton is that roam? 
ETJ.TS I wasn't in 'the resfcrocxn, I was ii 1 the shop putting a load wheel in. I 
just stood up, grabbed a towel, wiped my hands off, walked out into 'the 
battery room, and;,, I was right there in the doorway when he walked i n, 
SPENCER Okay. At—at th i s time he had already changed the battery? 
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ELLES 
JUDGE 
FT •• . T S 
JUDGE 
ELLIS 
JUDGE 
ELLIS 
JUDGE 
ELLIS 
JUDGE 
KTJJ.q 
JUDGE 
ELLIS 
JUDGE 
ELLIS 
JUDGE 
ELI1S 
JUDGE 
SPENCER 
JUDGE 
ru.gr':t, When, :*.-;•,** . > ;- .: i ,. xi. . , n . ;
 : i i ' a yeen ^ - . - ^ i t n e 
d i d n ' t put t> . _ i<-r/- in. continued t c ^eat on i t , I w a l ^ ^ to the bacK 
of i t ?cause I JKIH'T want t o act h i t - the face, with anvtinnq. 
Okay- i<> xn the beginn:^ 
fo rk l i f t . 
were a t the opposite r.ido of th*1 
Oka, 
pro 
u:.-.::, ^u-z.-x-r^y, when you : xrst came m . ti*>i~ *"*: came in, 
1 » it- t~^
 t«~ ry-
Okay - v>o you were at 'the north there, and then he 'was at the "west. 
Then you moved fron the ncrth \l.'\n . er t* the east; and, between you, 
then, vxs th ccrrectr 
Right; uh -hen.. 
( . > ;;? 
He was -wou^or/i
 r^ .* tn^ p^ citt- ti. w^ , itt-JTg jt acnin. 
Okay, ^i ^v ^\.ld you «**=• ^ J T P 
1 QKiJdn't S « J hm feM it (Jul i ^ r t l a i l a r mintiW., 
Okay. 
But, ±.ike l sa,\ A i* s:^ -.rvj irom the backside 'to 'the—from the north 
side tn the easr £id* 
North to east, okay. 
I'd seen him striking it, standing on the rail, already, from the north 
side. And then when he wouldn't put trie plate in, I walked back to the 
north side so that I wouldn't get ivt -Ith anything 
Okav Iliprii any! Innq flr-v yon hnvf 
No. 
Okay. You, Ms. Henderson? 
29 
HENDERSON No, 
JUDGE 
SPENCER 
JUDGE 
CLAIMANT 
JUDGE' 
CI AIMANT 
CLAIMANT! 
Okay , Then, any other testimony thatfs needed, do you need to recall 
your witness? 
Not at this time, 
Okay, Anything else you,. wish to state? 
Jast that I wasn't banging on the lift when he came ait. Arid, say, this 
is the lift here, it's about this high, — 
Okay, that's to your' chest; and you're, what, about 5 - -
I don't understand how he th inks 1 :ie • ::a n see iny feet, i f hr*'1 mi 1h<> 
other side of the lift, over' here. 
He said ho CXMJ.1I In*t , 
And I 'wasn't 'banging' on it when he came out. And I wasn't banging on it 
at all. 1—-When he was on the other side, where he couldn't see my 
feet, is when I slipped; and when I tried to regain my balance from 
falling backwards, that's when T hit tn*-. plat*, or hit the plastic. 
JUDGE Okay. All right, 
Ms, Henderson? 
mg in dosing; m e n 
HENDERSON Yes. The enployer contends that the c. •-.-*.. : *as '.u:^^/,.^ i_
 JM% 
cause, under—and has established. kncwlocijL, juipaoility and control, 
Based on his prior incidents that had occurred, and the final incident 
was cause for immediate dismissal. He did not provide this excuse that 
he lost his balance at the time of the discharge, and Mr'. Ellis has 
nothing' to gain by stating what happened. He's testified he saw him, 
beating" on it and. testified what took place: after that. Eenefi ts should 
remain denied, and the enployer' relieved. 
JUDGE II ian> *> • *u I4i Spencer. 
SPENCER We believe that the company has failed to meet their obligation to prove 
just cause. In 1990, there was an incident which played a part in 
deciding the termination in this—this incident. It also shows an 
inconsistency on. a part of the employer 'whereas; it—the: enployer 
contends that the claimant intentionally damaged company property in 
1999 (sic), at that time he was suspended. Two and a-half (2 1/2) years 
later", again, the—the enployer alleges that the claimant intentionally 
inflicted damage upon company property. The claimant has stated that 
the battery cover was already broken, that he slipped and fell and made 
a small chip m ~~. And for the—those reasons and others, we believe 
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